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PURcHAsER FOR VALE.-A purchase for value without notice
has important legal consequences. Under the rules of equity one
who purchases for value a legal title or interest without notice of
outstanding equitable interests is not bound to recognize those
interests.' Another way of stating the same conclusion is fre-
quently employed by the courts, viz., that a purchaser for value
without notice cuts off all equities. In the law merchant, adopted
by Lord Mansfield into the common law, perhaps the most impor-
tant doctrine was that in the transfer of bills of exchange and
promissory notes a purchase for value without notice had the effect
of cutting off defenses which might have been used by the maker
of the obligation against the original obligee or any party other
than the purchaser for value without notice. This doctrine has
been codified into the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law .2 Un-
der our Recording Statutes providing for the recordation of writ-
ings affecting the title of land or chattels, it is commonly provided
1 Hoult v. Donallne, 21- W. Va. 294 (1883); Bassett v. Mosworthy, 2 Lead.
Cas. Eq. 1; Warner v. Winslow, 1 Sandf. Ch. 430 (N. Y. 1844).
2 See W. VA. CODE, 1916, c. 98A, § 52 defining a holder in due course; § 57
defining the rights of a holder in due course; § 58 defining the rights of one not a
holder in due course
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that an unrecorded instrument shall be void as against subsequent
purchasers for valuable consideration without notice' It will be
observed that under the provisions of the Recording Statutes not
only equitable interests and personal defenses but complete legal
titles are extinguished by a purchase for value without notice. The
scope of the doctrine is constantly expanding. By the Uniform
Sales Act 4 and the Uniform Stock Transfer Act 5 the effect of the
purchase for value without notice is to extinguish some rights
which could have been asserted against the vendor.
In analyzing the phrase "purchaser for value without notice,"
three questions present themselves. (1) What is a purchase? For
example, does the acquisition of an equitable interest in the prop-
erty in question constitute a purchase or is the meaning of the
word limited to the acquisitoin of a legal title or interest? (2)
What is meant by "value" when that word is used in this con-
nection? (3) What is notice? This discussion will be limited to
the second of the above matters, that is, to determine what meaning
the decisions have given to the word "value" in applying the doc-
trine of purchase for value without notice.
An heir of a trustee is not a purchaser for value and is bound by
the trust.6  An executor is bound by the trust.7 A donee of the
trust res takes subject to the trust." The widow will be prevented
by a court of equity from asserting dower,9 or homestead interest 0
in land held in trust by her husband. Likewise a husband is not
entitled in equity to curtesy in land of which his wife is a trustee.1
At common law when the trustee of personal property died intes-
tate and without next of kin the Crown took the title to such chat-
tels as bona vacantia, and upon the attainder of the trustee of per-
sonalty for felony or treason, the Crown took legal title to the
personal property by forfeiture, but in both cases the Crown not
being a purchaser for value would upon petition of right give
relief to the beneficiary of the trust.1 2 In the case of the death
of the trustee of land without heirs, the lord taking by escheat
was not, at common law, bound by the trust for the reason that
8 See W. VA. CODE, 1916, c. 74, §§ 4, 5.
4 See § 76 of UNIFORM SALES ACT; see also WILLISTON, SALES, § 619.
5 See § 22 of the UNIFORM TRANSFER ACT.
Anonymous 1474, Fitzb. Abr. Subpoena pl. 14; Y. B. 22 ED. IV.
fol. 6, pl. 18 (1482).
7 Mortimer v. Ireland, Chancery 1847, 11 Jur. 721; see W. VA. CoDE, 1916,
c. 132, § 6.
a Anonymous 1522, Y. B. 14 Hen. VIII fol. 4, pl. 5; Otis v. Otis,
167 Mass. 245, 45 N. E. 737 (1897) ; AmEs, LECT. ON LEG. HIST. 285; 17 CALIF.
I. REv. 283; ibid 479.
9 Noel '. Jevon, Preem. C. C. 43 (1678).
10 Osborn v. Strachan, 32 Kans. 52, 3 Pac. 767 (1886).
1 Bennett v. Davis, 2 P. Wins. 316 (1725); PzRRY. TRuSTS, § 322.
22 Hix v. A. G., Hard. 176 (1673) ; see 144 L. T. 170.
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the lord did not take in privity with the trustee, but by paramount
title.1 3 In most of the above cases the legal title or interest is one
which the laws casts upon a person without his giving in return
any thing which has even the semblance of value. In the follow-
ing cases, however, it becomes necessary to determine whether the
word "value" as used in the phrase "purchase for value" is ap-
proximately synonomous with the word "consideration" as used
in the law of contracts.
One who takes a conveyance from the trustee of the legal title to
a trust res but gives in return only his promise to pay is not a pur-
chaser for value.14  He must surrender the res to the cestui que
trust, and is, of course, relieved of his promise to pay the trustee.
If, however, he, after his purchase but still before notice of the
defense or equity, pays for the property he then holds it free and
clear.' 5 If he pays after notice, he is bound by the trust." If
the promise given in exchange for legal title is a promise to marry,
the purchaser takes free of trust, upon the theory that there is an
actual giving of value by entering into the status of an engaged
person.' 7  If the purchaser's promise to pay is given in the form
of a negotiable instrument, which is subsequently negotiated to a
holder in due course the purchaser has, of course, paid value and
is protected,' but if the negotiable instrument has not been nego-
tiated when the purchaser receives notice he is not protected."e
His course should be to immediately restrain the negotiation of
the instrument by the holder.
If a purchaser has secured the legal title to trust property but
has paid only a part of the consideration, he should, of course, be
protected to the extent of his payment. This protection is accom-
13 Burgess v. Wheat. I Ed. 177, 201, 246, (1759) ; Hardman, Law of Escheat,
4 L. QuAn. Rav. 318. 329.
14 McNight v. Parsons, 136 Iowa 390, 113 N. W. 858, (1907) ; City Dep. Bk.
Co. v. Green (Iowa) 103 N. W. 96 (1905), 106 N. W. 942 (1906) ; Citizens
State Bk. v. Cowles, 180 N. Y. 346, 73 N. E. 33, (1905); Manufacturers' NaL
Bk. -v. Newell. 71 Wis. 309; 37 N. W. 420, (1888); Hodge v. Smith, 130 Wis.
326, 110 N. W. 192 (1907), accord. Royal Dank v. Tottenham, 2 Q. B. 715, 717,
(1894) ; Capital & Counties Bk. v.. Gordon, (1903) A. C. 240, contra. Mann V. See.
Nat. Bank of Springfield, Ohio, 30 Kans. 412, 1 Pac. 579, (1883).
Is Fox v. Bank, 30 Kans. 441, 1 Pac. 789, (1883) ; First Nat. Bk. v. McNalry.
122 Minn. 215, 142 N. W. 139, (1913) ; Cunningham v. Holmes, 66 Neb. 723, 92
N. W. 1023, (1902); U. S. Nat. Bk. v. McNair, 114 N. C. 335, 19 S. E. 361,
(1894) ; Merchants Nat. Bk. v. Santa Maria Sugar Co., 162 N. Y. App. Div. 248,
147 N. Y. Supp. 498, (1Q14).
16 Tourville v. Naish, 3 P. Wins. 307 (1734).
'7 Smith -v. Allen, 5 Allen (Mass. 1862) 454; Huntress v. Hanley, 195 Mass. 236.
80 N. E. 946 (1907) scmbe; De Hierapolis v,. Reilly, 44 N. Y. App. Div. 22, 60
N. Y. Supp. 417, (1899) ; Lionberger v. Baker, 88 Mo. 447, (1885) contra. See
Boggess v. Richards, Admr., 39 W. Va. 567, 20 S. E. 599, (1894) ; Vance v.
Riehards, Admr.. 39 W. Va. 578, 20 S. E. 603, (1894).
Is Davis v. Ward, 109 Cal. 186, 41 Pac. 1010, (1895), semble; Partridge, Wells
& Co. v. Chapman, 81 Ill. 137, (1S70) ; Freeman v. Deming, 3 Sandf. Ch. (N. Y.
1846) 327.
'1 Davis v. Ward, 109 Cal. 186, 41 Pac. 1010, (1895) ; Rush v. Mitchell, 71
Iowa 333, 32 N. W. 367, (1887) ; Jones v. Glathsrt, 1 1" Ill. App. 630, 641, (1901).
See contra, Citizen's Bank v. Shaw, 14 S. D. 197, 84 N. W. 779, (1900).
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plished in one or the other of two ways in different jurisdictions.
In most cases the purchaser may retain the title only as security
for the repayment to him of the amount advanced by him in the
purchase of the res"0 in some jurisdictions under these circum-
stances the purchaser retains a beneficial interest in the res sub
ject to a lien in favor of the cestui que trust for the unpaid por-
tion of the purchase price.21 By the latter view the purchaser gets
the benefit of his bargain, including, of course, any increase in the
value of the res, and the cestui que trust accordingly loses his ben-
eficial ownership in the res and gets merely a claim for money.
The West Virginia court adopted this latter view in the case of
Mitchell v. Dawson.2 2 In that case a purchaser had paid all of
the purchase money, being about $2,000.00, with the exception of
$25.00, when he received notice of an equitable lien held by a prior.
vendor against the property. The court held that the purchas-
er's title was clear except that he must pay the remaining $25.00&
to the equitable incumbrancer.
The question of whether the law should regara the taking of
property in payment of, or as security for, a pre-existing debt is
the most troublesome question which arises in the attempt of the
law to define "value." It has been held that the taking of real or
personal property other than negotiable paper or money as security-
for a pre-existing debt is not a purchase for value .2  The taking-
such property in payment of an atecedent debt has been variously
treated. In Virginia and West Virginia one who takes land or
chattels either as security for, or in payment of, an antecedent debt
is a purchaser for value.2 ' Perhaps the numerical weight of au-.
thority is that such taking in payment is a purchase for value,
but many courts take a contrary view. 5 The law should probably-
make no distinction between the cases of the purchase of prop-
erty in payment of and as security for a pre-existing debt. It is.
true that in the case of payment of an antecedent debt, the pur-
chaser if he is deprived of the res will be under the necessity of
re-establishing the debt in law. He will, however, have no dif-
ficulty in doing this. He is hardly more likely to find himself in
a less favorable position for the collection of the debt than is
w Henry v. Phillips, 163 Cal. 135, 124 Pac. 837, (1912); Youst v. Martin. 3
S. & R. 423, (Pa. 1817.) ; POiEROY, EQ. JUnis., § 750.
2 Citizen's Bank v. Shaw, 14 S. D. 197, 84 N. W. 779, (1900) ; Mitchell v.
Dawson, 23 W. Va. 86, (1883) ; POMEROY, EQ. JUMS., §750.
23 W. Va. 86, (1883).
13 See POMEROY, EQ. JURis., § 749.
24 See POMEROY, EQ. JURIS., § 749 and cases cited; W=STON, SALEs, § 620.
Wickham v. Martin, 13 Gratt. 427, (Va. 1856) ; Gilbert v. Lawrence, GO:
W. Va. 281, 49 S. E. 155, (1904).
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the person who takes the res as security for the payment of an
antecedent debt. In both cases the purchaser has generally delayed
collection of the debt because of the payment or security and,
hence is, in fact, in a somewhat less favorable position than he
would have been had it not been for the purchase.26 If the creditor-
has surrendered or cancelled other securities for his debt upon the
faith of his purchase of the res, he is a purchaser for value.27 In
that case it is practically impossible for the purchaser to restore
himself to his status quo ante if he is deprived of the res. At com-
mon law one who took either money or negotiable paper either as
security for or in payment of an antecedent debt was in most states.
held to be a purchaser for value.28 *Whatever difference of opinion.
existed among the state courts was remedied by the Uniform Nego-
tiable Instruments Law, which provides that29 "'An antecedent or
pre-existing debt constitutes value." It will be seen that many
state courts have defined the term "value" differently in the case
of a purchase of negotiable paper on the one hand and the pur-
chase of land or chattels on the other hand. The explanation for
this lies in the desirability of a free transfer of negotiable instru-
ments in the interests of commerce.2 0 These reasons do not apply
with equal strength to the transfer of land and chattel .
It is the general view that an assignee for the benefit of credi-
tors is not a purchaser for value. The courts have said that the
assignee should take no better title, no higher rights, than the
assignor himself had; that if the assigned estate is subject to a
trust, the assignee should take subject to the rights of the equitable
owner.31 The West Virginia cases, following the Virginia cases,
take the opposite view, and hold that the assignee for the benefit
of creditors is a purchaser for value, just as if he were an indi-
vidual or a trustee for a single creditor who had taken a con-
veyance as security for an antecedent debt.2 2  The results are so
striking that the doctrine deserves examination. In a Virginia case
See PRosoy, EQ. Jums., § 749 for a discussion of this point.
Franklin Say. Bank v. Taylor, 53 Fed. 854, (1893) ; Richardson v. wren.
11 Ariz. 395, 16 L. R. A. (N. S.) 190, 95 Pac. 124, (1908) ; Grand Rapids Nat.
Bank v. Ford, 143 Mich. 402, 107 N. W. 76, (1906).
Holly -v. Missionary Society, 180 U. S. 284, (1901) ; Spaulding v. Hendrick,
172 Mass. 71, 51 N. E. 453, (1908); Stephens v. Board of Ed., 79 N. Y. 183,
(1879).
20 See NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENT LAW, § 25; W. VA. COnE, 1916, C. 98A,§ 25.See PoaEnoy, EQ., Ju-is., § 748 (1).
In re Howe, 1 Paige 125, (N. Y. 1828) ; Van Heusen v. Radcliff, 17 N. Y. 580.
(1858) ; Griffin v. Marquart, 17 W. Va. 28, (1880) ; Stainbach v. Junk Bros. Co..
98 Tenn. 306, 39 S. W. 530, (1897) ; see Po=Raoy, EQ. Jun1s., § 749.
5' Wickham v. Lewis Martin & Co., 13 Gratt. 427, (Va. 1856); Chapman v.
Chapman, 91 Va. 397, 21 S. D. 813, (1895) semble; Gilbert Bros. V. Lawrence Bros.
56 W. Va. 281, 49 S. E. 155, (1904); Marshall v. McDermitt, 79 W. Va. 245, 90
S. B. 830, (1916).
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before the separation, 33 a merchant, B, had by his fraud, secured a
purchase of goods from A. Shortly thereafter he made an assign-
ment for the benefit of his creditors. The court held that his
assignee was a purchaser for value, and the rights of the creditors
were superior to the equity of the defrauded vendor to recover his
goods. Thus property, which in equity belonged to A, was sub-
jected to the debts of B, although the creditors of B were not
shown to have relied and probably did not rely upon the title in
the debtor, or forego any rights because of the conveyance to their
trustee. If an individual creditor of B had taken a mortgage or
deed of trust covering these goods, he might claim some equity in
being allowed to retain them, in consideration of forbearance to sue
or demand other security but in the case of a general assignment
it is submitted that there is, ordinarily, no value given, and, unless
there are circumstances of laches or estoppel, the creditors should
not be allowed to have the benefit of the property. The doctrine
then had its origin in this and other Virginia cases 4 which gave
no promise that it would be a useful or equitable rule. The first
West Virginia case 5 to apply to the doctrine, doubted its sound-
ness on principle. It has since, however, been several times applied
in reported West Virginia cases both to cut off interests acquired
under prior unrecorded conveyance 3 and interests arising under
general doctrines of equity.3' Perhaps the most effective way to
strike at the root of this inequitable doctrine would be to adopt the
view that the taking of title to property other than money and
negotiable paper, as security for an antecedent debt is not, prima
facie, a purchase for value, but that special circumstances of dam-
age, by forbearance to sue or loss of other means of recovery,
might be shown, to give the creditor a prior right, in whole or
in part.
L trustee in bankruptcy is not a purchaser for value.3 8 In spite
,of the provision of the National Bankruptcy Act, Amendment of
1910 to Sect. 47a (2), that "such trustee shall be deemed vested
with all the rights, remedies and powers of a creditor holding a
m Wickham v. Lewis Martin & Co. supra, note 32.
"Wickham v. Martin, supra note 32; Evans v. Greenhow, 15 Gratt. 157 (Va.
1859) ; Exchange Bank v. Knox, 19 Gratt. 747, (Va. 1870) ; Antoni v. Wright, 22
'Gratt. 837, (Va. 1872).
3' Western Mining Co. va. Petoyna Cannel Coal Co., 8 W. Va. 406, (1875).
Weinberg v. Rempe, 15 W. Va. 829, (1879) ; Hardin va. Wagner, 22 W. Va.
56, (1883) ; Duncan v. Custard, 24 W. Va. 730 (1884) ; Cox v. Wayt, 26 W. Va.
107, (1885); Zell Guano Co. v. Heatherly, 38 W. Va. 409, 18 S. E. 611, (1893) ; Mar-
Shall v. McDermttt, 79 W. Va. 245, 90 S. E. 830, (1916).
*1 Wickham '. Martin, supra, note 32 ; Gilbert v. Lawrence, 56 W. Va. 281, 49 S. E.
155, (1904) ; Throckmorton v. Throckmorton, 91 Va. 42. 22 S. E. 162, (1895).
33 Carpenter v. Marnell, 3 B. & P. 40, (1802) ; Ex parte Dumas, 2 Ves. Sen.
Z82, (1754) ; Kip v. Bank of N. Y., 10 Johns. 63. (N. Y. 1813) ; Blin v. Pierce.
20 Vt. 25, (1847).
6
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 29, Iss. 2 [1923], Art. 6
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol29/iss2/6
EDITORIAL NOTES
lien by legal or equitable proceedings," the-West Virginia Supreme
Court of Appeals in a recent case has held that the trustee in bank-
ruptcy "takes the property of the bankrupt, not as a bona fide
purchaser, but in the same capacity and condition that the bank-
rupt himself held it, and subject to all equities impressed upon it
in the hands of the bankrupt. . .,"I If the trustee were really
given the rights of lien creditor, as the Bankruptcy Statute pro-
vides, he would be preferred to the holder under a prior unrecorded
conveyance, under the West Virginia Statute.40  But the case of
Custard v. McNary4' is undoubtedly right as applied to unrecord-
able equities.
In most jurisdictions a judgment creditor is not a purchaser for
value,4 2 nor is an attaching creditor.43  Even such lien creditors
then are postponed to the equities already attached to the prop-
erty. But under the West Virginia recording act4" creditors are
given precedence over interests acquired under prior unrecorded
instruments. They are not made purchasers for value by the stat-
ute, but are given a status in some respects superior to that of pur-
chasers for value, since, as to them, notice is immaterial.'" The
word creditor as used in the statute has been construed to include
only lien creditors, such as have statutory liens4" or have secured
an attachment, 4  or a judgment duly docketed. The failure to
record does not prejudice outstanding non-recordable interests,
such as those acquired by an oral contract of purchase4 or the
assignment of an obligation secured by a mortgage or deed of
trust," nor, presumably, to equities arising out of resulting or
constructive trusts, or fraud, mistake, etc10 It should be repeated,
however, that even the attaching or judgment creditor has no
priority by virtue of the general doctrine of purchase for value,
but only by the operation of the recording statute and its express
provision for creditors. -- J. IV. M.
31 Custard v. McNairy, 85 W. Va. 516, 102 S. E. 116, (1920).
40 See W. VA. CODE, 1916, c. 74, § 5.
4, Custard v. McNalry, supra, note 39.
42 Whitworth v. Gougain, 3 Hare, 416, 1 Phil. 728, (1844) ; Dyson v. Simmons,
48 Md. 207, (1877); Harney v. First Nat. Bank, 52 N. J. Eq. 697, 29 AUt. 221,(1894) ; see POMEROY, EQ. JURIS. § 721.
43 Waterman v. Buckingham, 79 Conn. 286, 64 Atl. 212, (1906); see BOGERT,
TRUSTS, p. 520.
" See W. VA. CODE, 1916, c. 74, § 5.
4 Guerrant v. Anderson, 4 Rand. 208, (Va. 1826) ; Anderson v,. Nagle, 12 W. Va.
98, (1871) ; Delaplain -. Wilkinson, 17 W. Va. 242, (1880); Snyder u. Martin.
17 W. Va. 276, (1880); Pack v. Hansbarger, 17 W. Va. 313, (1880); Abney v.
Ohio Lumber Co., 45 W. Va. 446, 32 S. E. 256, (1898); Marshall U. McDermitt,
79 W. Va., 245, 90 S. E. 830, (1916) ; see 2 MINO's INST. 866, 872.
46 Clarksburg Casket Co. U. Valley Undertaking Co., 81 W. Va. 212, 94 S. E.
549. (1917).
47 Smith v. Rush, 79 W. Va. 228, 92 S. E. 247, (1916).
48 See cases cited supra, note 45.
4 Citizens Bank v. Harrison Doddridge Coal Co., 89 W. Va. 659, 109 S. E. 892
(1921) ; but see W. VA. CODE, C 74, § 11 (ACTs or 1921, p. 173).
50 See W. VA. CODE, 1916, c. 74 § 5 which makes no provision for recordation
of such miscellaneous equities.
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